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Summary 
How do popular protests about the basics of everyday life, specifically about energy, come 
about in settings where political authority is fragmented and conflict and repression 
common? How do state and political actors respond to protests which disrupt social and 
economic life, and undermine public authority? To what extent do such mass protests, often 
justified as inherently moral struggles over the basics of everyday life, empower the 
powerless or hold the powerful to account in such political settings? And how do external 
actors shape these events? These are the questions addressed in this paper, part of a 
research project under the UK Aid-funded Action for Empowerment and Accountability 
(A4EA) programme at the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex. It is a preliminary effort 
to make sense of a specific category of popular protests, mass protests about the 
affordability or availability of fuel or energy, seen as among the contentious ‘politics of 
provisions’, or elite-mass struggles over policies governing the necessities of everyday life. 
The paper aims to: (a) contribute to theoretical debates about the kinds of social and political 
action that strengthen accountability and empower the marginalised in fragile and conflict-
affected settings; (b) make an empirical contribution to the contentious politics literature with 
new evidence about the nature of energy-related protests (or ‘fuel riots’) in developing 
countries, to strengthen the political economy analysis of energy subsidy reforms and 
austerity programmes, shedding new light specifically on the tendencies of non-democratic 
regimes to maintain high fuel subsidies; and (c) generate knowledge about how the 
behaviour and practices of external actors shape how energy protests play out in these 
fragile political settings, in order to inform policy and practice. 
 
The paper draws on: (a) an events catalogue built on a review of international media that 
was; (b) triangulated and refined further through a research workshop and discussions with 
participants, direct observers, and other scholars. These research activities were designed 
to investigate the phenomenon of energy-related protests (definitions and forms of which are 
discussed) in settings marked by fragile or fragmented political authority or where conflict is 
common or recurrent, what is known in development thinking as fragile, conflict, and 
violence-affected (FCVAS) settings. The focus is on the period 2007–17, a time of unusual 
turbulence in global commodity and financial markets, and of correspondingly intense 
national and transnational struggles over austerity regimes, financial shocks, and commodity 
price spikes in countries around the globe. The paper draws on the events catalogue and 
workshop contributions to develop preliminary analysis of how grievances about energy 
connected to other material and political grievances in the society. It sets out initial findings 
about the social and political alliances that emerged between the informal sector workers, 
youth, and urban working class groups that were on the frontline of most protests, and other 
actors such as business, political parties, trades unions, civil society organisations and 
broader social movements. It explores the repertoires, or the styles and forms taken by the 
protests, reflecting on how those were transformed over the episodes of contention, and 
specifically in counter-response to the state response. The paper presents the synthesis of 
these inquiries, which it situates within the limited relevant literature on energy protests and 
the political economy of development in fragile settings. It concludes with a discussion of 
knowledge gaps and potential research agendas on the contentious politics of energy 
provisioning.  
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1  Introduction 
How do popular protests about the basics of everyday life, specifically struggles over mass 
access to energy, come about in settings where political authority is fragmented and conflict 
and repression common? What forms and expressions do such protests take? How do state 
and political actors respond to such protests, which disrupt social and economic life, and 
undermine public authority? Do such mass protests, often justified as inherently moral 
struggles over the basics of everyday life, empower the powerless or hold the powerful to 
account in such political settings? And how do external actors shape these events? These 
are the questions addressed in this paper, part of a research project under the UK Aid-
funded Action for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) programme at the Institute of 
Development Studies, Sussex. It is a preliminary effort to make sense of a specific category 
of popular protest in recent history, namely episodes of mass or popular protest about the 
affordability or availability of fuel or energy in Egypt, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, 
Pakistan and Zimbabwe, in the decade following 2007, a period of widespread and recurrent 
global food, fuel and financial crises. It analyses these protests within a conceptual 
framework derived from theories of the contentious ‘politics of provisions’, or elite-mass 
struggles over policies governing the necessities of everyday life. This draws attention to the 
following elements of how contentious struggles ‘work’ to bring about political and policy 
change in the domains most relevant to mass patterns of everyday life: the identities of 
protestors and their grievances; modes or repertoires of protest and the responses they elicit 
from the state; the means by which protests are ‘amplified’ or undergo ‘scale-shift’, 
transforming from local or particularistic struggles to wider, more systemic political complaint; 
and the political alliances and political cultural effects to which these episodes contribute.  
 
The paper explores these elements of energy protests in these settings in order to (a) contribute 
to theoretical debates about the kinds of social and political action that strengthen 
accountability and empower the marginalised in fragile and conflict-affected settings, by 
focusing on the informal and extra-institutional politics through which power is contested in 
such settings; (b) make an empirical contribution to the contentious politics literature with 
new evidence about the nature of energy-related protests (or ‘fuel riots’) in developing 
countries; this is important in particular because it should strengthen the political economy 
analysis of energy subsidy reforms and austerity programmes; and (c) generate knowledge 
about how the behaviour and practices of external actors shape how energy protests play 
out in these fragile political settings, in order to inform policy and practice. 
 
Patterns of popular political contention and civic engagement are closely shaped by the 
nature of political power and the state in any context. While the unruly politics of provisions 
since 2007 have not been confined to FCVAS settings, there are good reasons to believe 
that such protests may have a particular significance in contexts where more formal or 
institutionalised forms of democratic and civic space have historically been restricted or 
repressed. The episodes studied here took place in countries featuring fragility and conflict in 
various degrees and forms; although the paper examines variations within that set, it does 
not compare them with protests in more stable and democratic settings. Building on 
Andresen’s important 2008 analysis of the political mechanisms that safeguard fuel 
subsidies in authoritarian (far more than in democratic) settings, we aim for a closer 
exploration of the dynamics of contention in different kinds of fragile or conflict-affected 
settings, ranging from authoritarian and repressive through to more competitive and 
fragmented forms of power. We would expect state–society relations and civic and political 
institutions to differ in countries featuring relatively competitive, although conflictual and 
fragile (Pakistan, Nigeria) compared to more dominant (Mozambique; Myanmar, later in the 
decade) or outright authoritarian and repressive (Myanmar before 2011, Egypt and 
Zimbabwe through most of the decade) modes of political power. The analytical strategy is 
to attempt to draw out patterns specific to FCVAS settings, while also, where relevant, 
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drawing attention to how differences in political and civic space appear to be shaping the 
frequency, nature or form of energy protests.  
 
There are sound grounds, framed well by the Sustainable Development Goal 16 (promote 
peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all 
and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels) for understanding the 
causes and effects of energy protests. These protests can be violent and disruptive, and loss 
of human life is common. While contention over energy is likely in any modern energy-
dependent, urbanising economy, violence and disruption may not be an essential part of 
such struggles. However, if citizens’ legitimate concerns lack effective ‘civil’ pathways to 
influencing policy, specific triggers (subsidy cuts, fiscal or monetary reforms that shift prices, 
corruption in the energy sector) seem likely to lead to unruly political contention, and in ways 
that attract state violence and elicit antagonistic counter-responses.  
 
In a globalised energy economy, distinctions between ‘external’ and domestic influences on 
popular politics can be overdrawn. Nonetheless, groups not customarily seen as central to 
domestic political contention play several distinct roles in these protests. The international 
media frames these struggles for both internal and external consumption, and shaping the 
events themselves, the responses they engender, and the agendas for research (Hossain 
2018). International aid donors create funding regimes for civil society that discourage or 
prevent grassroots mobilisation or responsiveness to ‘messy’ popular political concerns; this 
can mean that important, potentially disruptive, groups in society then make their voice 
heard in other, less ‘civil’ ways (de Brito, Chaimite and Shankland 2017). Austerity regimes 
under IMF packages feature in these protests, as does external investment in the energy 
sector by world powers.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 tours the limited relevant research on fuel or 
energy protests. Section 3 documents our conceptual thinking and its adaptation to a 
methodological framework to address preliminary questions about these types of protest 
episodes. Section 4 explores the causes (grievances, triggers and pre-existing networks for 
mobilisation) and effects (policy changes, coalition-building, organisational learning, public 
opinion shifts) of episodes of energy protests in six settings of fragility, in Egypt, Myanmar, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe, during the decade 2007–17. Section 5 
discusses the role of external actors in these struggles, including of the framing by the 
international media. Section 6 concludes with some preliminary analysis of how these 
elements fit together, and with reflections on the need for and conceptual, methodological 
and practical challenges of further research into energy protests in such settings. 
 
 
2  Energy protests/fuel riots: a literature 
review 
Energy features in contemporary protest literature in a range of ways. A substantial body of 
literature explores resistance to energy investments in the global North. This includes 
analysis of ‘green’ resistance to fracking, pollution, fossil fuels and nuclear energy (Plows 
2008), as well as on the locations of energy plant (van der Horst 2007). Protests by 
European farmers and hauliers in 2000 were in key respects the opposite of the customary 
ecological protest, as their activists demanded and to some extent extracted concessions 
over fuel pricing (Doherty et al. 2003). The literature on energy protests as these relate to 
the fragile and under-developed settings with which we are concerned is considerably more 
limited, however, perhaps reflecting the comparatively recent nature of these protests on any 
scale or spread to date. There is analysis connecting energy and protest through the 
influence of biofuel investments on the food riots of 2007–08 (Dauvergne and Neville 2010); 
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these protests draw attention to the globalised nature of contemporary protest struggles, but 
offer no insight into protests specifically about grievances relating to energy specifically, how 
these connect with subsistence grievances around, for instance, food, nor how these 
emerge out of and resonate with other local or national political struggles.  
 
A more relevant body of literature is on the ‘IMF Riots’ or ‘structural adjustment riots’ in 
response to the neoliberal economic reforms of developing countries during the 1970s and 
1980s. Energy-related protests were among the episodes of popular resistance triggered by 
the first wave of IMF regime reforms (Walton and Ragin 1990; Walton and Seddon 2008), 
but these studies undertook comparatively little analysis of protests around energy 
specifically, including them under the wider ambit of ‘food riots’. The connections between 
mass protests about price changes and subsidy reforms emerged across food and fuel 
market emerged again in research on urban price protests in sub-Saharan Africa (de Brito, 
Chaimitie and Shankland 2017; Sneyd 2017; Engels 2015).  
 
Debates about the political economy of fuel subsidies have drawn attention to the frequency 
and significance of popular protests about energy pricing, typically viewed as an obstacle to 
fiscally-necessary reforms (see Lockwood 2015; Inchauste and Victor 2017). Reform 
programme design needs to take into account the ‘political logic’ behind the adoption of the 
subsidy, and the support base and political efficacy of struggles for its continuation (Victor 
2009). Public choice theoretical perspectives have concluded that fuel subsidies tend to be 
substantially larger in semi-authoritarian regimes than other types of polities, both because 
these enable grand corruption by ruling elites, and because ‘concern about regime 
legitimacy and the wish to stay in power’ encourages regime responsiveness to protests 
among core support groups (Andresen 2008: 6). Authoritarian regimes may be less able or 
willing to supply public goods, or particular kinds of energy subsidy may suit their 
‘selectorate’ particularly well, shoring up the support of key groups; patterns of fuel use by 
different groups at different stages of urbanisation and development also shape the politics 
of fuel subsidies (Strand 2013).  
 
Other relevant research has attempted to unpick the relevant relationships between regimes 
types, conflict and protest and prices of basic goods, chiefly of food (Berazneva and Lee 
2013; Hendrix and Haggard 2015; Hendrix and Brinkman 2013). This literature is illustrative 
of aspects of these relationships, but overall somewhat inconclusive on the nature of political 
power arrangements which give rise to or enable such protests to emerge; nor, again, do 
they provide a distinctive focus on energy protests specifically. The limited nature of the 
relevant literature is plain: one recent PhD dissertation on the subject of recent food and fuel 
riots concluded that ‘research on fuel riots is currently non-existent’ (Natalini 2016: 3). The 
present preliminary exploration of fuel riots – or as we prefer, energy protests – is intended 
to engage with and stimulate any emergent debates about this apparently increasingly 
important phenomenon.  
 
The historical and contemporary literature on food riots during moments of adjustment to 
capitalist economies provides useful theoretical and methodological starting points for the 
investigation of energy protests, while also keeping in mind the important specificities of 
energy as distinct from food. It helps to recognise that so-called ‘food riots’ were one part of 
the ‘politics of provisions’, or ‘the ways in common people interacted with their rulers over 
subsistence... permitted and shaped by pre-existing social and political networks, both 
among rioters and between them and their rulers’ (Bohstedt 2016: 1036). Such struggles 
were constant and ongoing, yet typically only became overt in moments of economic crises, 
when food shortages and price spikes resulted from war, disaster, or trade policies, in 
contexts where people’s relationships to food were increasingly commoditised, leaving 
anyone on a low or precarious income acutely vulnerable to the downside of market forces. 
‘Moral economy’ ideas, particularly pertaining to the responsibilities of public authorities to 
protect the people’s right to eat against the right to profit from the food trade, were often 
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important parts of the political culture of these struggles, justifying unruly, disruptive, and 
even violent, assertions of those rights (Thompson 1971, 1991).  
 
Yet not all the hungry protested, and food rioters were rarely the poorest or worst off. A 
physiological mechanism through hunger translates into anger and anger into protest is 
plainly inadequate for explaining why food riots occurred, or what they meant. Instead, 
patterns of food riots across Europe strongly suggest the need for explanations rooted in 
contentious political theory. Key issues on which to focus include the identities and previous 
political experiences of protestors, the political opportunities for mobilisation afforded by the 
crisis itself, and in particular as it affects groups connected by location, identity or 
occupation; the means of amplification and through which grievances undergo ‘scale-shift’, 
taking up more (or less) of the national political agenda; and the iterative relationship 
between repertoires of protest and official response (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001).  
 
A recent comparative study of contentious recent struggles over the right to food involving 
some of the authors of the present paper  concluded that food riots ‘work’ by shifting political 
interests and ideas with respect to provisioning, but that several factors are critical. 
Protestors tend to denote the presence of reasonably coherent groups visibly affected by 
policies governing basic provisioning (e.g. macroeconomic exposure to global food (or in the 
present study, fuel), price volatility; food (or energy) price regulations; food (energy) 
subsidies and transfers; wage policies). But the appearance of spontaneity implied by ‘riots’ 
was often belied by the fact that many protest groups had prior histories of organising, as 
well as political champions or allies in trades unions or occupational associations, political 
parties, civil society or the media. It was also clear that such protests resonated with, and 
informed, struggles over the terms of the subsistence settlement or social contract governing 
economic and sectoral policymaking. Critically, protests emerged under conditions in which 
aggrieved groups ‘read’ the situation as one in which they had a realistic chance of drawing 
official attention to their concerns, and of demonstrating willingness to use disruption and 
moral shaming to extract the desired concessions (Scott-Villiers and Hossain 2017). The 
study of energy protests drew substantially and directly on the analysis of the mechanisms 
through which other struggles over subsistence during the same period of volatility worked to 
materially change the politics of provisions in each context. 
 
 
3  Approach and methodology   
3.1   Mechanisms of impact/applying the learning from the food riots project 
As noted above, members of the research team had recently completed a study of food-
related popular mobilisation in Bangladesh, India, Kenya and Mozambique during the period 
2007–12. Although keeping in mind that energy protests may have particular dynamics 
absent in food riots (and vice versa) relating to the sector itself, some of the lessons about 
how food riots ‘work’ to generate political change seemed applicable to the question of 
energy protests in fragile settings, and were used to develop a conceptual framework and 
methodological approach for the study.  
 
In the absence of a literature on the triggering contexts, forms and modes, and wider 
impacts of fuel price protests, we drew on and adapted a conceptual framework developed 
to make sense of food price-related protests over some (2007–12) of the ten-year period in 
which we are interested. The framework is depicted in summary in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: How fuel price protests work: a dynamic model 
 
Source: Adapted from Hossain and Scott-Villiers (2017). 
 
The key propositions about how fuel price protests provoke policy or political responses are 
as follows. Mass or unruly demonstrations and riots that protest the new unaffordability of or 
lack of access to energy have an impact under the following conditions: 
 
 Experiences of sudden fuel price rises affect large groups of the national population, 
particularly in cities, and in particular people on low incomes. The nature of the impact 
of fuel price rises depends on relative prices, the extent of any subsidies, the share of 
energy in household spending. 
 Shared space, including common occupations and means of transport create 
conditions in which grievances about price rises may be aired and shared 
 Opposition leaders identify this as a political opportunity to broker mass mobilisation, 
accrue political capital, or undermine the legitimacy of the regime, often drawing on 
past experiences of similar protest episodes. 
 Food riots ‘work’ in part through the connecting glue of a set of reasonably strong, 
broadly-shared ‘moral economy’ beliefs about how food markets should run, and the 
responsibilities of public authorities to ensure they do (Hossain and Kalita 2014). We 
do not know if something similar exists with respect to fuel price rises; it is possible 
that fuel crises lack the moral urgency of food crises, the contemporary politics of 
which are often rooted in formative historical experiences of dearth. Alternatively, the 
reliance on energy in modern life means that rising fuel costs or bus fares may sharply 
increase the costs of work, forcing people into harder and longer working days, or 
other unsatisfactory amendments to their work-life pattern.  
 Past responses to fuel price protests are likely to shape the expectation of elite 
responses, and this will in turn shape the likelihood and form of action taken 
 The present elite response to the current crisis combines repression with immediate 
policy responses, particularly if the ruptures appear likely to escalate in scale or spread 
 The media and a capable political opposition amplify the concerns of protestors in 
particular ways. 
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Drawing on the insights from contentious politics theorising, we expected individual protest 
events to be linked together dynamically, shaped by expectations based on past 
performance and on the current political calculus, and by the counter-response and 
changing context it may engender (Tarrow 2011; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Tilly 
2008). Critical concepts here include ‘scale shift’, in which response and counter-response 
bring about a ‘change in the number and level of coordinated contentious actions leading to 
broader contention involving a wider range of actors and bridging their claims and identities 
(McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 331). 
 
The research started with a close focus on events framed as around fuel prices, in line with 
the expectation that food price rises driven by the global commodity spike of 2007–08 were 
the key grievance. This proved an inadequate framing for energy protests, for several 
reasons. First, global energy price rises transmitted unevenly to countries, depending on 
pre-existing subsidy and tax regimes, playing a direct role only countries without important 
subsidies (in our cases, Pakistan and Zimbabwe). While global energy prices shape the 
fiscal space for subsidies, governmental decisions to cut subsidies owed more to the 
introduction of austerity regimes than market price changes. Second, protests relating to 
energy policy included grievances about access and shortages (Pakistan and Zimbabwe) as 
well as large investment projects (the Ar Shwin Chinese gas pipeline in Myanmar, in 
particular). In Nigeria, energy protests fused grievances about political elite corruption in the 
oil industry with those about subsidy cuts and the impacts on subsistence.   
 
3.2   Media review/events mapping exercise 
3.2.1 Event identification and selection 
To gather evidence on these elements of the fuel price protest model, we mapped energy-
related events in the six countries, using international media coverage as the main data 
source. Relevant events to be mapped/reviewed were selected based on the following initial 
criteria:  
 
1. The events took place within the last decade in the six countries, all fragile and 
conflict-affected and/or lower or middle-income countries  
2. Protests were identifiably related to fuel price rises, and this was listed as a grievance 
by protestors or those reporting on the protest 
3. The cases involved a series of unruly events rather than a single episode or event. 
This is important in order to gain a sense of the interaction between protestors and 
authorities, and of the outcomes of such events. 
 
After an initial review of findings, the decision was made to focus on fuel price-related 
protests in each country, as offering the greatest chance of enabling cross-country 
comparisons. Later, the somewhat different cases of Pakistan and Zimbabwe were added, in 
which protests were chiefly about energy shortages, and although connected to mass 
concerns about energy costs and access, were not chiefly driven by them. These, as well as 
the loose coalition between fuel subsidy cut protestors, chiefly urban youth, and trades 
unions in the lucrative but leaky oil transport industry, highlight the ways in which energy 
protests could encompass wide cross-class coalitions of interest, at least temporarily. This 
then highlighted the importance of exploring energy protests somewhat more broadly, to 
include the possibilities of these cross-class coalitions around energy use. 
 
3.2.2 Databases, tools and search terms 
The Event Mapping/Media Review involved several rounds of search and preliminary review, 
in order to refine and finalise search terms and overall search strategy. Two main sources 
were used: the Nexis news database (Nexis.com), and a general sweep of the internet using 
search terms specific to each country and events.  
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Some indicative estimates of the numbers of potential news articles addressing the issue of 
fuel price protests (as compared to ‘protest’ more generally) are given in the figures below. 
 
Figure 3.2: Search results by country and search term 
 
Source: Authors’ own.  
Note: For each of Egypt, Nigeria and Pakistan, the numbers of article returning ‘protest’ in the headline was over 3,000. 
 
It should be noted that searches are sensitive to search terms used, and that the numbers of 
articles returned does not necessarily match frequencies of events or their significance. 
Mindful of the impacts of media framing on how such ruptures are covered in developing 
countries and therefore on the results of such searches (Hossain 2018), different search 
terms were trialled in the Nexis database, and then cross-checked against wider internet 
searches. Search terms such as “fuel riot” + COUNTRY generated few results; less colourful 
but more precise terms such as “fuel / gas / oil price protest” generated more for most 
countries. The search period was for the past decade, namely 01/01/2007 to 01/01/2017, to 
capture the early onset of the fuel and food crisis of 2008 and to bring it as up to date as 
possible. 
 
Data about the numbers, participants, locations, grievances and responses to fuel price 
related protests in each country were stored using a framework developed to build events 
catalogue as part of an earlier project on food riots. In each country case, an effort was 
made to contribute evidence from the Event Mapping/Media Review towards understanding 
the following: 
 
a. the conditions under which such protests emerged 
b. the grievances being articulated 
c. the absence of alternative, more institutionalised and dialogic modes of engagement 
with civil society and formal politics 
d. the effects and outcomes of such political events in the short- and longer-terms, and 
e. risks and opportunities for external actors to engage with such contentions, to support 
processes of empowerment and accountability for disadvantaged and disenfranchised 
groups. 
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Quantitative findings about the nature of the protests in each of these countries over these 
years, including who was protesting, about what, with what kinds of a response (data 
permitting) were distilled. From the Event Mapping/Media Review activities, and supported 
by other literature where relevant, brief overviews of the nature and significance of fuel price 
protests in each country were developed, pending further discussion at the January 
workshop. 
 
Additional fuel price, subsidy and consumer price inflation data were sought to provide a 
basis for comparing contexts across the countries (see Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4). Figure 3.4 
shows that global fuel price rises were marked during 2007–08 and 2011–12, but as Figure 
3.3 shows, these global fuel price movements played out unevenly in consumer price 
inflation during the period. This reflects, among other matters, the range of different policy 
instruments with which governments seek to insulate populations against sudden price rises, 
including energy subsidies and fixed consumer or industrial prices or allowances. 
 
Figure 3.3: Inflation, average consumer prices (% change) 2000–17 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/02/weodata/index.aspx (accessed 21 December 2017) 
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Figure 3.4: Global food and fuel prices, 2000–17 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=24&pr.y=16&sy=2000&ey=2017&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=
country&ds=.&br=1&c=001%2C603&s=POILAPSP%2CPNRGW&grp=1&a=1 (accessed 21 December 2017) 
 
From earlier research that used a media review-based events catalogue to identify and 
analyse food-related protests, we were aware of the strengths and limitations of these 
methods (Hossain 2018). To study energy protests, we included only English-language 
items, so that all domestic news in the vernacular was excluded. This meant that it was only 
the events deemed sufficiently newsworthy due to their rarity (Myanmar) or violence 
(Mozambique and Nigeria) that appeared in initial searches. Less dramatic protests, such as 
small but frequent demonstrations in Pakistan over energy access, and the series of protests 
in Zimbabwe after 2015, appeared less frequently. Yet this did not mean that events in 
Pakistan or Zimbabwe were necessarily less significant moments in the politics of provisions 
in those contexts. These biases were identified and partially corrected through a more in-
depth hand search of online media sources, but it nonetheless highlights the independent 
framing role played by the international media, and the limitations of a media review-based 
analysis of energy protests. 
 
International media review/events catalogue methodologies are also limited in their capacity 
to identify protestors and grievances in each particular setting, as the need to communicate 
stories across political contexts leads to an inevitable flattening out of the complexities of 
identity, interest and opportunity involved. Read from above or outside, an energy protest 
looks one way; from the ground, many more features can be seen, and the overall picture 
does not always look the same from that perspective. Greater knowledge of the context and 
the actors in each setting is necessary to make sense of why such protests emerge and their 
implications. Nonetheless, media review-based events catalogues do have the advantage of 
establishing key facts about these events (who, when, where, how), which can also help to 
correct the interpretative biases of knowledgeable local actors themselves.  
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3.3 In-depth analysis/workshop 
In an effort to correct for the biases and limitations of the media review, a second round of 
research activities involved scholars and activists in reflecting on and collectively comparing 
findings about these energy protests in each setting. A research workshop entitled ‘Unruly 
Ruptures in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings (FCVAS)’ in Brighton, 28 February to   
1 March 2018 brought together 15 scholars and activists to reflect on the findings of the 
media review/events mapping.  Scholars and activists were invited to prepare a commentary 
on the media review/events catalogue, adding their own research, data, or observations of 
the actual protests and their aftermath in each setting. Discussions of the media 
review/events mapping by the scholars and activists during the workshop are synthesised in 
the analysis below. The workshop participants also discussed the need for and approaches 
to further research on energy protests in fragile settings. 
 
4  Causes and effects of energy protests 
Table 4.1: Summary of key energy protest features 
Country Dates, places, 
scale 
Actors and groups Specific 
grievances 
Political & policy 
responses 
Myanmar  6 weeks, August 
2007 
Initially peaceful 
small protests grew 
into thousands, 
possibly more, in 
city streets, mostly 
but not only in 
Yangon 
Possibly started with 
urban industrial 
workers; soon taken 
up by democracy 
protestors, then by 
monks and wider 
population 
Became known as 
‘The Saffron 
Revolution’ 
The removal of 
subsidies leading 
to sharp increases 
in consumer 
energy prices, at a 
time of great 
hardship and rising 
costs of living 
Subsidies were 
reinstated in some 
places; arrests and 
violence against 
protestors, at different 
points triggered a 
‘scale-shift’ 
Later US sanctions in 
protest against 
repression 
Described as a ‘failed 
revolution’ (Shen and 
Chan 2010; Selth 
2008) 
Egypt Protests about 
energy prices 
scattered 
throughout decade; 
series of fuel- / 
other cost of living 
related protests 
immediately 
precede & morph 
into 2011 uprisings. 
[Events during the 
Revolution were 
excluded from this 
search]. Specific 
protests in the 
Media Review: 
2008, 2010, 2011, 
2012, and 2013. 
Urban industrial 
workers; urban 
transport users; 
general urban 
public; social media 
role? 
High fuel prices 
and subsidy cuts  
Some cuts were 
rescinded or delayed. 
Fuel price protests 
were among other 
struggles which 
culminated in political 
turning points such as 
Tahrir Square, the 
Tamarod Campaign. 
Despite protests in 
2016, reform 
programmes are 
proceeding, under an 
IMF package.  
(cont’d.)  
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Table 4.1 (cont’d.) 
Country Dates, places, 
scale 
Actors and groups Specific 
grievances 
Political & policy 
responses 
Mozambique 2008 and 2010 Chapa transport 
users, general 
public; social media  
 
 
Fuel subsidy cuts 
in a time of higher 
cost of living 
Subsidies often 
temporarily reinstated; 
violent repression by 
the state, which 
brought out the tanks. 
13 deaths, including of 
2 children. Country 
now negotiating an IMF 
reform after the 
austerity regime that 
followed Mozambique’s 
loss of credibility in 
capital markets / 
withdrawal of donor 
funding after the ‘secret 
debt’ scandal. 
Nigeria 2012; 2 weeks in 
January 
‘Tens of thousands 
around Lagos, and 
in Kaduna, Benin 
City, and Kano.’  
Urban transport 
users, trades unions 
(particularly fuel-
related trades), 
general public, 
popular musicians 
(Femi Kuti, son of 
Fela Kuti, took up 
the cause); social 
media 
Fuel subsidy cuts, 
that is, cuts to the 
only public benefit 
from Nigeria’s vast 
oil wealth, known 
to be subject to 
grand corruption 
Subsidies temporarily 
reinstated; later 
withdrawn under an 
IMF reform package 
The protests part of the 
political transition?  
Lasting anti-corruption 
movement (Occupy 
Nigeria) 
Pakistan The Nexis.com 
search yielded too 
few results to 
analyse. Hand 
searches on google 
identified protests in 
2010 and 2012, and 
on a smaller scale 
2015. Umair 
(workshop 
participant) 
identified a larger 
number of protests, 
big and small, from 
the national press. 
Transport workers, 
industrial workers, 
traders, farmers, 
factory owners and 
business people, 
the general public  
Protesting prices in 
many instances, 
but chiefly 
shortages and 
access 
 
Zimbabwe The Nexis.com 
search yielded too 
few results to 
analyse. Hand 
searches on google 
and in discussions 
with Simbarashe 
(workshop 
participant) and 
from Marjoke’s 
knowledge of urban 
popular politics, 
events were 
identified throughout 
the years 2015–
2017. 
General public, 
transport users, car-
users 
Protesting prices 
and shortages, 
including in a 
period of currency 
reform 
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4.1 Egypt 
The Media Review/Event Mapping for Egypt identified fuel price protests, and reported 
concerns about fuel price protests, at several points through the decade, rather than 
concentrated at a particular moment in time. The exception is the period of the 2011 protests 
that lead to the Tahrir Square moment. We looked at protests recorded as in some way 
related to fuel prices, but noted that the motivations and demands of protestors and protest 
groups varied and shifted over time, becoming increasingly connected with political demands 
during the 2011 revolution. The 2011 Tahrir Square occupation and protests cannot in any 
sense be described as ‘fuel price protests’. However, fuel price protests both pre-date 2011, 
within the 2007–17 period, and post-date it, marking in particular the 30 June 2013 episodes.  
 
Key moments at which fuel price protests were recorded included: 
 
 Prior to our period, from 2006, industrial and public sector workers had been striking 
for higher wages to pay for rising living costs; over 200 episodes were recorded in 
2006 alone  
 International media first picked up fuel price protests specifically on 8 April 2008, when 
industrial workers in Mahalla struck for higher wages, protesting the rise in food and 
fuel prices and the conduct of recent local elections; the area had been restive 
throughout 2007; the government responded swiftly and favourably, with raises and 
other benefits 
 May 2008: nationally, taxes and fuel prices were hiked to pay for public sector wage 
rises, raising fears of further protests 
 fuel price-related protests then reappear in late January 2011, when protests against 
high food and fuel prices triggered the onset of the anti-authoritarian movement in 
Egypt of that year [note: we have excluded from this analysis the entire remaining 
protests and struggles that resulted in the resignation of President Mubarak in 
February 2011] 
 After fuel subsidies were cut as part of a 2012 IMF package, protests started up again 
across different groups and parts of the country; compared to 2010, there were four 
times as many protests in 2012, according to one source (Shukrallah and Ali 2013) 
 By 2013, with fuel shortages underpinning the risk of renewed unrest, the Tamarod 
Campaign raised millions of signatures demanding President Morsi’s resignation, 
following which a coup / revolution replaced the Muslim Brotherhood leader with 
former-General Sisi 
 Further fuel price-related protests were reported in 2016, in response to proposed 
economic reforms under the IMF package.   
 
It is important to note that the significance of fuel prices and subsidies is subsumed within 
the far larger and wider struggle against Mubarak or authoritarianism. Nevertheless, it seems 
clear that fuel prices were a specific trigger for protests preceding, and indeed succeeding, 
the Tahrir Square uprisings. They drew a direct connection between the political 
management of the economy and the political legitimacy of the regime. That fuel subsidies 
were implicated in the removal of Morsi and have successfully been reduced in the years 
since under the aegis of an IMF programme of reform and deficit reduction again draws 
attention to the significance of the economic structures of everyday life in shaping the 
prospects for empowerment and accountability in Egypt.  
 
Industrial workers appeared to have been the first to protest during this period, winning pay 
rises at the expense of further fuel subsidy cuts and tax hikes for the rest of the population in 
2008. Social media emerged as a feature of mobilisation early on, as young urban activists’ 
efforts to use Facebook to organise strikes and protests in 2008 attracted 70,000 Facebook 
followers, although it failed to generate real (or ‘offline’) mobilisation at first. In the early part 
of the period, grievances were about rising living costs in general, and fuel prices were part 
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of the overall discontent about the economy. By 2011, the cost of food, particularly bread, 
came to be a core grievance.  
 
Material grievances then soon connected to the wider problems of economic management 
under authoritarian rule. Public finances were in a perilous condition as global fuel prices 
rose again in 2011: Egypt’s vast fuel subsidies amounted to almost US$10bn, or 8 per cent 
of GDP, before the 2011 uprising (Ellis 2010). In an effort to cut public expenditure as crude 
oil prices again breached US$100 a barrel in 2010, the Egyptian government took steps to 
cut the subsidy. Subsidies were further cut in the aftermath of the Revolution as part of 
structural adjustment package, first in 2014: this time, cuts faced no protests. In 2016, fuel 
subsidy cuts elicited a number of further scattered fuel price protests around the country. 
The fuel subsidy bill remains a vast US$11bn at current prices (see Table 4.2).  
 
Table 4.2: Egypt's energy subsidies (US$ million) 
Fuel 2014 2015 2016 
Oil 16,096.1 9,669.9 5,840.1 
Electricity 5,227.1 4,969.2 4,989.6 
Gas 1,634.2 502.4 298.8 
Coal - - - 
Total 22,957.3 15,141.5 11,128.5 
Source: IEA fossil-fuel subsidies database, www.iea.org/statistics/resources/energysubsidies/ (accessed 20 December 2017) 
 
Other sources, which it is unfortunately at present impossible to cite, similarly highlighted the 
importance of energy and related costs of living as triggers for initial protests which then 
rapidly turned political. Police brutality and torture triggered a massive political campaign, 
and triggered the events of 2011. Blogging and digital activism pre-2011 found activists new 
ways of hedging against risks, enabling a transplanting of political awareness to a new 
space, but with no guarantee that the digital and offline space of dissent and protest would 
come together. However, a political events catalogue based on Egyptian sources selected to 
cover a range of newspaper types uncovered 35 episodes of energy-related protest up to 
2013. It found that material and political grievances frequently merged in these protests, but 
that prior to 2011, price rises had been a core grievance. It also found that many protests 
were primarily led by women, reflecting women’s responsibilities for managing for the family 
budget, and that protests were primarily in Cairo and principal towns. Categorisations of the 
protests revealed that ‘the masses’ was the most frequent category of protestor, and over 
half the protests specifically cited economic grievances. Repertoires have changed over 
time, from protest to the blocking of highways, sit-ins, and continuous protest; numerous 
‘million-person’ (large) events, which contributed to the downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood 
government. The last protests in the Egyptian newspaper catalogue were on 28–30 June 
2013, followed a 100 per cent increase in fuel prices as a consequence of IMF conditions. 
There was a rise in price of meat, veg, and in basic foodstuffs – and food prices reflect 
transport. More recent efforts to cut fuel subsidies spawned movements with slogans such 
as ‘You have Made us Hungry’, ‘The Revolution of the Poor’, and Dunk (a slogan word for 
extreme poverty); however, these have failed to mobilise significant street action in a context 
of tighter laws against protest and a strong counter-response on social media to activists 
efforts to mount protests. 
 
4.2 Myanmar 
The key episodes of fuel price protests in Myanmar between 2007 and 2017 took place over 
the six weeks between 19 August and 25 September 2007. The country was rocked by an 
unprecedented series of protests triggered by, and focused throughout on, the government 
announcement of subsidy cuts that would raise the cost of petrol by two-thirds, double the 
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cost of diesel, and increase the cost of compressed natural gas (CNG) a staggering fivefold 
(AFP 2007). A protestor explained: ‘We are marching to highlight the economic hardship that 
Myanmar people are facing now, which has been exacerbated by the fuel price hike’ (Win 
2007). 
 
Economic hardship was a central theme. Members of the ‘recently formed "Myanmar 
Development Committee," had staged a February protest in downtown Yangon with placards 
calling for better health and social conditions and complaining about economic hardships’ 
(Associated Press International 2007). Factory owners reported handling earlier protests by 
factory workers in August, negotiating wage rises in 87 Yangon factories ‘to help workers 
deal with the sky-high fuel prices’ (Htay 2007). People living at or close to the poverty line 
would have been particularly hard hit by steep rises in the cost of living; we now know that in 
2005, that was almost half the population, considerably more than previously assumed.  
Energy is a key concern, occupying a rising share of household spending, and Myanmar 
ranks low on ‘energy security’ (Sovacool et al. 2011). Fuel prices were heavily subsidised 
and were believed to cost more than spending on education or healthcare, but remained 
tightly rationed by the state (Overland 2016). 
 
The protests increased in scale, and peaceful, silent protests were met with an increasingly 
heavy-handed response by the military. Regime-backed thugs attacked protestors, while 
activists associated with the ’88 Generation Students group that led the 1988 revolt against 
military rule were detained. Then-Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi was still under house 
arrest, and the 2008 constitutional reforms that paved the way for quasi-democratic elections 
in 2012 and 2015 were in the future, but it was in response to these protests that Aung San 
Suu Kyi was permitted to make her first personal appearance since 2003. The protests 
retained a strong focus on the rise in fuel prices and economic hardship, but began to be 
explained with reference to the authoritarian political regime (Berger 2007). 
  
The protests escalated in scale and spread across other parts of the country later in August, 
winning some concessions and pushing back against state repression, but remained small 
and scattered until the monks became involved. By late August, with protests at several 
locations around the country already recorded, monks joined a demonstration in Sittwe in the 
northwest. A striking aspect of what later came to be called the ‘Saffron Revolution’, a 
reference to the photogenic colour of the Buddhist monks’ robes, was that monks marched 
holding their alms bowls upside down, signalling a refusal to accept donations from the 
army, a significant moral blow to the army and its legitimating ideology of rule (McCarthy 
2008).  
 
Myanmar was closed to the outside world, apart from some external radio and television 
access. Stories about the protests were circulated and re-circulated in the international 
press. Many were sourced through the new medium of the internet, using mobile phones 
and portable satellite links, some financed by western aid or philanthropy. An exiled news 
groups, the Democratic Voice of Burma (Myanmar) (DVB), had deployed 100 citizen-
journalists on the ground in an anonymous network of reporters, to gather information from 
across the country (Thai News Service 2007a). Myanmar’s military rulers accused the 
foreign media of instigating the demonstrations and barred foreign reporters (Thai News 
Service 2007b).  
 
By the third week of September, protest participants were said to number 50,000 in Yangon, 
and tens of thousands in other towns. The army brought out 10,000 soldiers to ‘restore 
order’. In the violence more than 30 people were killed and around a thousand were injured, 
according to a UN observer. The fuel subsidy reform was partially rolled back, at least 
temporarily. 
 
23 
In response to the violence, economic sanctions were applied to Myanmar later in 2007. 
These squeezed Myanmar’s mining and gem markets, as they restricted access to US 
financial markets and targeted individual companies and business owners. Whether or not 
the ‘Saffron Revolution’ – and therefore, fuel price protests – played a significant part in the 
shift to democracy is unresolved. The moment has been authoritatively described as a ‘failed 
revolution’ (Shen and Chan 2010; Thawnghmung and Myoe 2008). It may have helped 
generate the 2008 constitutional reforms that enabled the NLD to assume part of the 
balance of power in the 2012 and 2015 elections, or to remove obstacles to a democratising 
shift (Seekins 2009; Steinberg 2008; Thawnghmung and Myoe 2008). Nonetheless, it is 
clear too that the democratising impulse has been partial and the power of democracy 
remains highly constrained – and quite possibly captured – in the political settlement that 
prevails in contemporary Myanmar (Rieffel 2013; Jones 2014; Bünte 2016), including within 
its civil society formations (Lorch 2006, 2008, 2017). 
 
Further insights about energy protests in Myanmar were provided through analysis of an 
events catalogue developing using ‘exile’ media over the period 2011–14.  Since the power-
sharing arrangement and the constitutional reforms, energy-related protests have continued 
in Myanmar. Yangon faces acute problems of power outages and is mainly served by 
captive generators. Of the 185 protests recorded by Andy Buschmann over the period    
1 February 2011 to 31 December 2014, an unexpectedly large number were linked to fuel-
related grievances. While several were about access and shortages, there were also 
protests against the Shwe gas pipeline. Protests about fuel shortages nest within wider 
contention around energy exports to China. Notable recent episodes included in May 2012, 
when candle vigils started in Mandalay, demanding 24 hour power supply. People gathered 
in front of power plants and protests spread to other parts of the country (see Figure 4.1 for 
an illustration of the locations of documented protests during 2011–14). Around 1,500 
people marched in Mandalay in some of the largest protests since the 2007 Saffron 
Revolution. The Shwe gas project, initiated in 2006, a huge gas deposit in the Bay of Bengal 
to pipe gas to China, and China’s second largest pipeline, is itself central focus of a protest 
movement. However, the population still has limited access to energy, yet sees energy and 
fuel exported to China, breeding a strong sense of inequality. Energy remains a signal 
source of contention in Myanmar, but its forms seem likely to change in a context in which 
widespread energy poverty remains, but which is also seeing an opening of the democratic 
and civic space. 
 
Figure 4.1: Map of protests in Myanmar, 2011–14 
 
Source: Buschmann (forthcoming), reproduced with kind permission. 
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4.3 Mozambique 
Mozambique experienced a series of fuel price-related protests during the period 2007–17, 
each of which resulted in an immediate policy response, usually backing down from the full 
reform or introducing new more targeted subsidies; state violence against protestors; and 
further hikes in prices down the line, finally resulting in the full removal of fuel subsidies by 
mid-2017. In the case of Mozambique, more than in Myanmar or Egypt, the protests could 
be described as riots, lethally violent efforts by the police to clear initially non-violent road 
barricades triggered violent resistance. Looting also occurred, primarily targeted bakeries 
and other individual businesses, often food shops owned by foreigners: the police did little to 
stop this, and many eyewitness accounts noted that some police joined in. 
 
Key events were clustered around two points during the period: 
 
• 5 February 2008: subsidy cuts on 23 January saw petrol prices increase by nearly half 
again, and diesel prices nearly double; protests erupted in Maputo and the suburbs of 
Magoanine, Matola City, when the Transport Ministry agreed an increase in fares on 
the chapas (minibuses) that provide much of the private transport in Maputo (Agencia 
de Informacao de Mocambique 2008). ‘Thousands’ were reported to have been 
involved in clashes with the police, according to the state radio; the final death toll was 
six, with at least three protestors shot by the police, and over 100 were injured. The 
subsidy cut was rolled back in part. In 2009, new subsidies were introduced to protect 
petrol companies from the losses from fixed prices. Other protests appear to have 
taken place in the week that followed, and was reported on 11 February in Chokwe in 
the southern province of Gaza. 
• 1–3 September 2010: against a South African rand that had appreciated by 43 per 
cent compared to the previous year, pushing up import prices in Mozambique, the 
state utility company raised rates by 13 per cent, while water and bread subsidies were 
also cut (AFP 2010). Riots were framed more around food prices in 2010 than fuel 
prices, as in 2008, but the overall rise in the cost of living was the general grievance 
expressed. ‘Thousands’ of angry ‘young men’ were said to have taken to the streets, 
again in Maputo’s poorer districts, again damaging private and public property, and 
again spread to other cities, including Chimoio in the Centre. In two days of protests, 
some 13 people, including at least two children, lost their lives, and an estimated 450 
people were injured. The bread subsidy cut was reversed, but later cut along with 
energy subsidies, as part of an austerity policy implemented from 2016 in the wake of 
the ‘secret debt’ crisis and ahead of the agreement of an IMF programme. It should be 
noted that prices had been fixed before the elections in 2009, and raised 
simultaneously in 2010, after the elections, triggering the protests. 
 
Mozambique has invested billions of dollars in oil and gas investments in recent years, but 
its high rates of economic growth have generated slow and uneven progress on poverty and 
human development (World Bank 2017a). The country is correctly understood as a 
predatory authoritarian state, in that the domination of power chiefly serves to enrich political 
elites and their business allies within and beyond Mozambique, even though politics and 
policies are often framed in terms of the nationalist and leftist struggles against colonial rule. 
Having historically subsidised goods that mainly benefited the urban lower and middle 
classes, such as bread, energy and transport. During 2010–14, these subsidies alone 
amounted to a cost of almost 1 per cent of GDP, and over 3 per cent of government revenue 
(World Bank 2017a).  
 
Analysis of the causes and effects of food and fuel-price related protests during the period 
2007–12 in Mozambique, part of the larger Food Riots, Food Rights project on which the 
present Unruly Ruptures study draws, indicated a causal connection between the loss of 
legitimacy following the response to the 2008 and 2010 riots and the rise of the urban-based 
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democratic opposition group MDM. It may also have contributed to the subsequent electoral 
success of the armed opposition group Renamo, which won the 2018 mayoral election in 
Nampula, the largest city in Northern Mozambique. The study also identified the rise of the 
virtual and cultural public spaces in transmitting calls for action, in particular to urban ‘digital 
natives’, users of social networks and digital media (de Brito et al. 2014; de Brito, Chaimitie 
and Shankland 2017).   
 
The context included a squeeze on public finances due to rising global price of fuel and fixed 
consumer energy prices/fuel and other price subsidies, in a context in which the majority of 
the population had seen slow progress, despite high rates of economic growth. Concerns 
about corruption under a dominant model of rule and the possibility of the MDM emerging as 
an opposition political force were part of the political landscape. Rising access to ICTs and 
new digital public space also featured. 
 
In 2008, fuel price protests emanated from the chapas stops in the poorer suburbs that 
transport urban workers, comparatively low paid mostly younger men in the informal sector, 
into the city centre. Also in 2008, protestors sought to prevent bus service owners from 
raising fares, in a classic ‘moral economy’ mode of restoring morality to markets. In both 
2008 and 2010, mobile phone messaging was reportedly a means of alerting protestors to 
action; in 2010, the Government of Mozambique responded by ordering service providers to 
halt service (with which order they complied). 
 
Violence was used, both by protestors and in the police response, which featured live 
ammunition from an early stage. The immediate and violent resort to the street suggests an 
absence of alternatives in the form of formal or civic forms of representation for low income 
urban chapas users. Trades union leaders argued for more distributive economic and social 
policies, but did not notably come out in support of protestors; civil society organisations 
were similarly notable for their detachment from the concerns of the urban precariat (de Brito 
et al. 2014). The term used for these actions was ‘greve’ or strike, and has its roots in anti-
colonial action. Popular cultural forms of amplification of protest messages through media 
such as hip hop music and cellphone ringtones appeared to have been important.  
  
The Brighton Research Workshop explored further the significance of the chapas for 
Mozambicans from the periphery. People are trapped in poverty – living near prosperity, but 
without access to it (Tvedten, Roque and Bertelsen 2013). Of the groups that come to 
Maputo for a better life, only to be trapped in the peripheries, the youth are most active in the 
revolts, reflecting resentment about an extended ‘waithood’, featuring a prolonged 
adolescence forced by their inability to earn enough to gain true adult independence in the 
city (Honwana 2012). When people took to the streets they demanded immediate change. 
The songs, slogans and SMS messages were directly critical of the Frelimo political elite and 
the business elite (treated as indistinguishable), linking political unresponsiveness and 
arrogance with economic inequality. Not even opposition political parties engaged in the 
riots; formal civil society only responded against the police overreaction.  
 
Popular culture was an important means of mobilising public opinion and galvanising protest. 
The popular and critically acclaimed Mozambican singer and songwriter, Azagaia, known in 
particular for his take on popular politics, became a key figure during the 2010 protests, 
when he was accused of inciting riots with his song ‘Povo no Poder’ (‘Power to the People’), 
recorded after the 2008 protests. In Minha Geração (My Generation), Azagaia’s raps about 
how his generation was the one that saw costs of living – but not wages – rise, and were 
criticised as lazy thugs, even while corrupt politicians crowd them into election rallies. The 
video shows Azagaia driving one of the iconic chapas vans, arguing that his is the 
‘generation of the competent, not the obedient’, that ‘does not allow the knot of its tie to/To 
choke down the cry of freedom that explodes in the throat’ (see Figure 4.2).  
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Violence and disruption were important features of these protests. There is a clear need to 
include transport as a theme in the grievances and organisational space around which 
energy protests might emerge. The roles played by popular music in amplifying or 
crystallising popular concerns, how different music reaches different social groups, classes 
and generations, and the role of broadcast and digital music sharing are significant in 
understanding popular politics in Mozambique. The mobilising potential of popular music in 
this context is clear, where election campaigns feature musicians, and major stars are in 
great demand for election parties. 
 
Figure 4.2: Still from Azagaia's Minha Geração video (2011) 
 
Source: www.youtube.com/watch?v=tFGh4Qp4Qaw. Reproduced with kind permission of KISAI. 
 
4.4 Nigeria 
In Nigeria, the period 2007–17 was marked by almost two weeks of violent protests over fuel 
price rises that took place between 3 and 16 January 2012. Starting with ‘thousands’ in early 
January, by the middle of the month protestors were counted in the tens of thousands, and 
in locations across the country, including around Lagos, and in Kaduna, Benin City, and 
Kano. These protests ‘accompanied a nationwide strike [which brought Nigeria] to a 
standstill with millions of trade union members downing tools’ (Pflanz 2012).  
 
The demonstrations aimed to enact: 
 
popular outrage at the scrapping of a government-funded subsidy that artificially kept 
petrol, diesel and kerosene prices as low as 26p a litre. Overnight, prices had risen to 
more than 56p a litre. Millions of Nigeria's poorest people, who survive on less than 
£1.50 a day each, will be hardest hit by the price increase. ‘This government is 
supposed to be there to protect us, to allow us to make business, to feed and clothe 
and educate our children, and now they are here shooting us,’ said David Amosu, a 
civil servant who joined one rally in Lagos. 
(Pflanz 2012) 
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In addition to civil servants, the unions came out, broadly in support of the protests, but 
nonetheless attempting to curtail their violence: 
 
One union leader described the federal government's hugely unpopular move as 
‘immoral and politically suicidal’, and urged Nigerians to resist ‘with everything they 
have’. But Tuesday's protest showed that, once unleashed, the pent-up anger of the 
masses could be hard to curtail. Angry crowds vandalised gas stations, intimidated 
owners into keeping their pumps unused and assaulted a soldier, showing how easily 
the fragile peace in Africa's most populous nation could spiral into chaos. One young 
man threw jerrycans of engine oil off the racks at a gas station and tried to damage the 
station's gas pumps. After union leader and chairman of the Joint Action Front, Dipo 
Fashina, asked the young man to stop vandalising the station, he did, but later started 
one of the first bonfires of the protest in the middle of the highway.  
(Alamba and Ibukun 2012) 
 
The pressures on the Nigerian state from the fuel subsidy were significant (see Table 4.3), 
amounting to some US$2.5bn annually. However, analysis indicated that reducing Nigeria’s 
fuel subsidy was likely to increase government revenues, but could impact adversely on poor 
household incomes, through higher costs of fuel and goods depending on fuel (including 
food), unless public spending was made more redistributive (Siddig et al. 2014). 
 
Early on, a connection was being drawn between corruption and the need to reform the fuel 
subsidy. Estimated at £5 billion a year, around a quarter of government spending, ‘rafts of 
allegations that large tranches of the money were pocketed by corrupt cartel bosses’ who 
benefited from Nigeria’s lack of refineries, in Africa's largest crude oil exporter (Pflanz 2012) 
 
Table 4.3: Nigeria, fuel subsidies in US$ millions, 2014–16 
  2014 2015 2016 
Oil 3,515.9 2,438.8 2,472.3 
Electricity - - - 
Gas 82.6 - - 
Coal - - - 
Total 3,598.5 2,438.8 2,472.3 
Source: IEA fossil-fuel subsidies database, www.iea.org/statistics/resources/energysubsidies/ (accessed 20 December 2017) 
 
Angry crowds vandalised gas stations, intimidated owners into keeping their pumps unused 
and assaulted a soldier (Alamba and Ibukun 2012). 
 
The superstar musician Fela Kuti’s son, Seun Kuti, came out in support of the protestors, 
marching shirtless among them, and speaking at protest rallies. One observer described 
how riot police repeatedly hit people with batons before firing into the air as the crowd, 
angered by the beatings, surged forward. ‘They fired up, then they fired down, that's when 
people were hurt badly.’ Elsewhere across the West African nation roadblocks with burning 
tyres were set up and hundreds of people marched through the streets with placards (Pflanz 
2012). 
 
One read: ‘Soon the poor will have nothing left to eat but the rich’. T-shirts were emblazoned 
with ‘Kill corruption not Nigerians’. 
 
Contributions to the workshop noted that the protests in 2012 were unusual for Nigeria.  
Protests around fuel subsidy removal have a long history, but had rarely been so big or 
widespread before 2012, or connected so many different actors. The long history of 
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authoritarian rule has meant response to unrest is generally force, a small number of actors 
in a tight civic and political space, and protests and demonstrations that are limited in scope, 
rarely spreading north. Religious and ethnic difference typically come to play in protests or 
unrest, raising questions about mobilisation around ethnic or religious lines; this tends to 
dissipate the common material basis of such concerns, for instance, about fuel subsidies. 
But 2012 was different: spontaneous, widespread, and uniting union and civil society 
activists behind a common grievance. The atmosphere was friendly, people playing football 
in the street, being entertained by famous singers. Timing was a factor: the announcements 
took place during the Christmas holidays, when many people had gone home and found 
they were unable to return. Subsidy cuts were not what the people had voted for in the 
recent 2011 elections.  
 
Looked at closely, the protests were not about fuel price rises alone. Placards and slogans 
included statements such as ‘Kill corruption, not Nigerians’. The fuel price rises became 
connected to charges of corruption. The Opposition party was active, addressing crowds, 
sometimes supporting protests. These became very clearly expressions of accountability, 
compared to previous protests around fuel price hikes. The official response saw a mix of 
labour unions, civil society groups, and entertainers and the general public and asked who to 
negotiate with. The labour unions (mostly in the fuel and transport industries) came to the 
table, got a price reduction, some subsidies back, and a hardship fund for their members. 
The demands of the young people, civil society, activists on the street were ignored, but the 
state was able to break the coalition by getting the unions to call off the strike. Fatai 
concluded: ‘When they were able to call in military etc., to tackle the ‘rabble-rousers’, that 
was the end of the Nigerian Arab Spring.’  There is a generational dimension, in that the 
older generation is accustomed to military rule whereas young people have had their 
aspirations raised by exposure to social media. It is notable that fuel subsidy cuts in 2016, by 
contrast, provoked no protests, and the contrast between the two highlighted the importance 
of political context: the President in 2012 faced many complaints of corruption, in which 
context the withdrawal of the subsidy was seen as siphoning off the modest benefits drawn 
by the majority of citizens for yet further corrupt uses. It is important to note that in the 2012 
oil subsidy protest, the unusual convergence of key rapporteurs of protests, i.e., civil 
society/civil right groups on the one hand and the labour unions on the other, brought a 
potency to the riots that produced an unintended consequence. Rather than cement the civil 
society-labour unions alliance, the 2012 oil subsidy protest and its attendant outcomes 
damaged mutual trust in such a way that forging a common front for future protests is 
uncertain. Civil society/civil right groups view the labour unions as unreliable, while unions 
perceive civil society as out of control, raising unrealistic demands. This lack of trust among 
the key mobilisers contributed to lack of coordinated popular response to the 2016 oil price 
hike in comparison to the 2012 protests.      
 
By contrast, in 2016, the President had the image of an honest man, an anti-corruption 
crusader. His government framed the subsidy removal as part of the fight against corruption. 
Trades Unionists commented privately on the need to be patient, rather than to protest. 
Overall, what mattered was differences in public trust, perhaps particularly among the key 
organising actors, and the timing of the reform initiative itself.  
 
Other contributions noted that the fuel subsidy was widely seen as the only social welfare 
that Nigerians received from the country’s natural resource wealth, and so had symbolic as 
well as material value.  Nigeria is also surrounded by poorer countries to which subsidised 
fuel is regularly smuggled. This vast illegal industry contributed to the tensions around fuel 
prices, as parts of the fuel industry profit from this trade. Protestors were arresting goats and 
holding impromptu roadside barbecues, while other ‘below the line’ expressions including 
people painting messages on their vehicles, and graffitiing. One protestor rode a donkey in a 
visual commentary intended to say, ‘look, soon we won’t have any fuel’.  
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The fuel protests of 2012 contributed directly to the 2012 Occupy Nigeria movement and the 
Enough Is Enough movement, with their strong emphasis on corruption. The selection of an 
anti-corruption Presidential candidate, and the political transition to the opposition, can also 
be connected to the 2012 struggles. 2012 was also marked by young people using social 
media to spread grievances and protests across the country (where in the past it would have 
been concentrated in the southeast). Since then, online activism had been increasingly 
energetic, but while more frequent, protests were generally small. 
 
4.5 Pakistan 
The Media Review/Events Mapping methodology returned comparatively few articles on 
Pakistan’s energy-related protests. However, Pakistan’s energy protests were in character 
and grievance protests more about access and shortages than sudden price hikes and 
subsidy losses; they were staged mainly by middle class rather than urban poor groups, with 
small and medium-sized business interests chiefly at stake and on the frontline of the 
protests. Energy access and shortages are concerns of the majority population, but fuel 
price rises are less prominent causes of protests in Pakistan, largely (it seems) due to the 
absence of an important fuel subsidy regime to trigger protests under austerity reform 
packages.  
 
The Media Review/Events Mapping returned a small number of incidents, in 2008, 2010, a 
short series in 2012, and again in 2015. The politics of energy appears to be a pervasive 
feature of political discourse, with several articles predicting protests by transport owners or 
workers when fuel prices rises or shortages anticipated, sometimes because trades unions 
have used these to issue warnings to the government. From the limited information 
available, it seemed that Pakistani energy protestors were more likely to be associated with 
the transport and industrial sectors that depend most directly on access to affordable fuel for 
their incomes, comprising CNG (Compressed Natural Gas) station owners and employees, 
private transporters, cab drivers, industrialists, factory workers, traders, and farmers. The 
‘general population’ were also said to have participated in some protests, but they were 
driven by clearly economic interests among reasonably well-organised groups.  
 
Contributions to the workshop offered more insights into the nature, context, and effects of 
energy protests in Pakistan during the period: 
 
Pakistan presents a salient case for the study of unruly ruptures and their impact, given the 
pervasiveness of formal and informal conflicts involving a range of actors as well as the 
vestige of a highly authoritarian state–society compact. These two legacies shape a context 
in which formal channels for grievance articulation, especially with regards to citizen rights 
and access to essential goods and services, are either weak or absent for extended periods.  
 
Key factors include the nature of urbanisation and demographic change in Pakistan – which 
has the fastest-growing urban population in South Asia - and changing energy needs and 
demands. These are occurring in a context in which political parties remain dominated by 
elites, and leave little space for the articulation and incorporation of mass concerns – for 
instance, around energy access or affordability. Popular political space is limited, featuring  
low-levels of organisational presence and contact at the lowest-tiers of politics, while civil 
society organisations are weak, dependent on donor funding, and unevenly distributed in 
spatial terms. 
 
At the same time, requirements for maintaining stable authoritarian rule and controlling 
popular pressures entailed a reasonably responsive social contract around basic needs 
provision. This was seen most clearly in the recent 2008 food crisis (see work by Haris 
Gazdar (2015) in particular on the moral economy of Pakistan’s response in 2008).   
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The nature of the fuel policy regime is central: Pakistan phased out fuel subsidies under IMF 
reforms in the 2000s, and now petroleum taxes comprise a significant revenue stream. Many 
of the population rely on biomass as energy sources. These factors together help to explain 
why fuel price protests are few and far between – only around 9 in the period 2007–17, and 
mostly organised by transport workers and related associations. By contrast, protests around 
access and shortages, including around electricity, were frequent and widespread, with 
around 209 such incidents. Analysis of an existing database of contentious political episodes 
for Pakistan (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2015; Butt 2016), indicated the large presence of 
informal groups, including citizens in low-income and informal neighbourhoods alongside 
professional/commercial unions and associations and political parties in protests around 
energy access and shortages in the period. At this time, it was possible to see images of 
bazaar traders and businessmen in suits marching alongside images of burning tyres, etc.  
 
Repertoires included demonstrations and rallies, highway blockages, and sit-ins, often 
disruptive events focused on government offices. The period of June – July 2012 saw 
spontaneous protests erupt nationwide, including in several cities in Punjab, also most 
urbanised. Energy shortages are most acute in summer, without the relief of fans or air-
conditioning. The state response was repressive, and at least 17 people were killed. But 
more repression would have been expected, and the relatively moderate response reflected 
that the police were under the opposition-led provincial government. 
 
The ‘wave of anger around energy/fuel shortages during the period under review was 
capitalised upon by the then opposition party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PMLN)’ 
which supported the protests, and put it at the top of their election manifesto for the 2013 
elections to defeat the ruling Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) in the most populous and most 
urbanised province, Punjab. Umair Javed summarised the politics of energy protests as 
follows: 
 
Commentators and analysts traced the scale of the PML-N’s victory down to the resonant 
framing of its campaign around the energy crisis, which helped build a voter coalition of 
disaffected elites (businessmen in particular) as well as marginalised groups in urban and 
rural areas.  
 
Taking power in 2013, the new government undertook to improve power supply with new 
gas imports and Chinese-supported power plants. Supply problems have eased, and 
protests with them, although the overall problems of sectoral governance and long-term 
supply remain. 
 
Discussions of the Pakistan case highlighted the limitations of the ‘price protest’ variable in 
the Media Review/Events Mapping methodology. The distinctively different nature of fuel-
related protest in Pakistan and Zimbabwe compared to the countries with fuel subsidies 
facing austerity regimes reflects in substantial part the different ways in which people 
engage with the state over energy access or affordability. This points to the need for a 
stronger grasp of the political economy of fuel pricing strategy in the country, to understand 
the elements of difference prices of different types of energy, including of taxation.  
 
The Pakistan case also highlighted the significance of cross-class alliances in energy-related 
protests, and in the incorporation of their grievances into the political party agenda. The 
PLMN opposition was able to capitalise on the discontent, which aligned well with its own 
business elite interests. The media played an active role in 2012, providing non-stop 
coverage, from its own socioeconomic and political bias, notably against the incumbent 
government. The elite politics of access to oil clearly matters here; private sector contributes 
around 60 per cent of oil refinery and distribution. Protestors are less focused on taxation 
than on access to natural gas and electricity, and on what is seen as a loss off access. 
People were used to stable energy access in the 2000s and therefore were not expecting 
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the loss of access. In Pakistan this was the first time an election focused on service delivery. 
It encouraged optimism about this newest phase of democratisation as about service 
provision. 
 
4.6 Zimbabwe 
The Media Review/Events Mapping exercise returned too few articles on Zimbabwe to 
develop a timeline of energy protests. In part this appears to reflect the nature and context of 
these protests: they were chiefly urban protests, often featuring comparatively affluent car-
users; they were also closely integrated within a wider set of grievances about economic 
mismanagement and the effects on everyday life for the majority, and the connected issues 
of corruption and authoritarianism. Unlike all the other countries, these do not appear to 
have been centrally protests about energy specifically. In a context of political fragility, in 
addition, it is not clear that the international media would have perceived them as significant 
or newsworthy as mere protests about the cost of living (etc.), in the Zimbabwe context, at 
least.  
 
The absence of much useable detail from the Events Mapping/Media Review means the 
following discussion relies chiefly on contributions to the workshop. There were particular 
similarities (lack of subsidy, long history of unbroken authoritarian rule) between Pakistan 
and Zimbabwe. Like in other countries, energy protests were not disconnected from broader 
grievances, including political complaints. With reference to the Zimbabwe case specifically, 
Simba referred to Wendy Willems’ argument that we need to understand political resistance 
beyond dramatic revolutions and rebellions in the face of widespread surveillance and a 
culture of suspicion, which has effectively suppressed many forms of protests before they 
could go to scale. The government always contained the protests early through deployment 
of repressive state security apparatus, mainly through brutal response by the anti-riot police 
and sometimes the notorious Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) officials to intimidate 
protest leaders and participants. 
 
Energy-related protests had been shaped by the protracted political and economic crisis 
since 1990s, but in particular by the recent period of hyper-inflation which reached its peak in 
2008. Fuel imports were a huge drain on foreign exchange, so the currency reforms left the 
Zimbabwean government with a procurement challenge. It should be noted that protests 
took place, but the Mugabe regime had crushed these brutally. But much of the protests and 
disgruntlement was very contained compared to other cases. 
 
The period 2015–17 had seen a spate of protests about fuel access and shortages, amidst 
wider concerns over cash shortages, increasing levels of (youth) unemployment, and legal 
restrictions on alternative and informal livelihoods. Government corruption and malpractice 
were considered the main cause for this dire state of the economy by many aggrieved 
citizens.  These protests were different from mass protests between 1999 and 2001: they 
were not organised by formal civil society (NGOs, human rights organisations and the labour 
union) or opposition political parties like the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) but by 
urban residents, people disgruntled by the problems faced in everyday life, and some 
organised social media movements that had emerged since 2013. These struck a chord for 
various reasons. The #ThisFlag movement was started by a pastor draped in the flag 
posting a video about his struggles with everyday life matters – such as getting fuel for the 
car and failing to get money to pay his children’s tuition at school among other problems. 
Within a day, the video that he posted on Facebook had been viewed 300K times, and 
sharers were using the national flag and the #ThisFlag to post their grievances, turning it into 
a comment on nationhood and nationalism, thus opposing the ways in which the state had 
promoted its own version of patriotic history and nationalism since 2000. Other movements 
included #Tajamuka – or agitated – ‘we have become unruly’ – with its roots in the informal 
vendor sector, and #ThisGown – unemployed graduates, become important part of the 
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protests (as noted above). These movements worked together to challenge the government 
to be accountable to citizens and to deal with the many problems that citizens were facing 
such as shortage of fuel, the increasing prices of energy, deepening corruption and massive 
unemployment. 
 
Repertoires ranged from protests in the street, political rallies, barricades of roads, even 
commuters. On 4 July 2016 there was a violent standoff between commuters and police on a 
number of issues such as fuel and roadblocks (that are used by police to get bribes). 
Commuter operators and many people in Harare commented that it was becoming 
increasingly difficult to do business or to travel because of the bribes demanded by the traffic 
police and fuel prices that continued to skyrocket. Fuel dealers justified hiking fuel prices to 
the introduction of bond notes and the lack of foreign currency to import fuel. The Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) was struggling to provide foreign currency to business owners 
selling their products in local bond notes. Therefore, many of the fuel operators purchased 
expensive foreign currency in the informal parallel market (black market). Repertoires 
included subversive musical lyrics, comedy, petitions of government, use of social media to 
mobilise protests and articulate grievances. Prayer vigils were set up, in the belief the state 
would not harm or attack people kneeling and praying. Relying on such symbolic and 
spiritual forms of protests disempowered the brutal anti-riot police who could not beat up 
praying protestors. Some members of the #Tajamuka movement also offered flowers to the 
police in response to police brutality.  
 
Social movements were largely apolitical and resisted being co-opted by political parties, 
although some protesters joined an alliance of opposition political parties under the banner 
of the National Electoral Reform Agenda (NERA). The protests are believed to have helped 
pave the way for the military ‘soft coup’ in November 2017, since the military needed to 
legitimise their action to especially SADC countries, and visible popular protest against 
President Mugabe would indicate support for his removal. In fact, the military urged the war 
veterans and leaders of the social movements to organise a massive protest in support of the 
military take-over. The march which legitimised the military take-over was on 18 November 
where protesters carried placards thanking the military generals for ousting former president 
Robert Mugabe. After the new government took over from Robert Mugabe, it made a 
statement on fuel prices and availability. The government ordered a decrease in fuel prices 
after reducing taxes and duty of fuel importation.  
 
The Zimbabwe case again highlighted the role of religious leaders, which as Ayo pointed out 
was not new – Desmond Tutu in the anti-apartheid struggle, for instance. In Nigeria, even 
though more outspoken clergy are holding government to account, sharp religious division 
between Christians and Muslims prevail against faith-based actors making common cause. 
The use of symbols such as the flag drew attention to the grievances being expressed as 
issues of nationalism, and possibly therefore as above partisan or factional politics. But the 
nationalist struggle would lack the resonance for the younger generation it possessed for 
their parents and grandparents, who had indeed had a common experience. 
 
4.7 Grievances and protestors 
Common patterns across the countries indicate that these are clearly material grievances in 
the first stages of protests: these are, at least, initially, clearly complaints about the impacts 
of economic policy on everyday life. They often appear to start with young, low income urban 
groups, industrial workers (Myanmar, Egypt), or transport users (Mozambique, Nigeria). 
Subsidy reforms provide the classic political opportunity, making most (not all) of these 
protests a category of ‘IMF riots’. Neither Zimbabwe nor Pakistan have had subsidies and in 
those settings, protests have focused on shortages and access, although prices have also 
played a role.  In terms of who protests, and about what, it is clear that protests that start off 
being about material matters of the cost of energy quite quickly morph into political 
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complaint, and a critique of authoritarianism and in particular, corruption. These protests can 
then draw in or be taken up by wider circles and groups, including democracy campaigners, 
the middle classes, and the wider population. The '88 Generation Students group played a 
key initial role in Myanmar’s 2007 events. In both Myanmar and in Zimbabwe, faith-based 
groups played a prominent role. In Nigeria and Mozambique, popular musicians articulated 
and amplified the grievances, and joined the protests. Pakistan saw a particularly wide range 
of class fragments and coalitions, bringing together business and factory owners with 
transport workers, commuters, and the general urban public. 
 
4.8 Forms and expressions/repertoires 
These took a wide variety of firms, apparently shaped by political context. Popular culture 
played a significant role in Mozambique and Nigeria, amplifying and dispersing grievances 
across populations, using songs and mobile phone ringtones to signal resistance to the new 
price regime. Across these settings, ICTs could become means of amplifying and organising, 
a fact which did not go unnoticed by governments, several of which moved soon after the 
events studied here to control or restrict virtual public space. But there were also instances, 
for instance in Nigeria and Egypt, where online organising or information had little discernible 
effect on the ‘off-line’ or real direct action. 
 
The ‘moral economy’ was notably expressed within organised religion, through the 
involvement of faith-based actors in protests. The involvement of monks in Myanmar clearly 
introduced strong moral and ethical overtones into what had already quickly transformed 
from small peaceful protests about fuel prices into democracy struggles. Arguably, their 
apparently large-scale participation in the 2007 struggles, including the highly symbolic act of 
marching with their bowls upturned to signal rejection of support from – and therefore, for – 
the military – was part of a ‘scale-shift’. That is, the problem went from being a specific 
concern about the cost of energy in a society already facing severe economic stresses, with 
rising world food and other prices beginning to bite, to a wider commentary on the moral 
authority of a state that does not deliver even basic public goods, but which represses 
demands for accountability for such failures. The scale-shift here involves a shift of the 
grievance from the sector to the system, and from the specific concerns of those most 
affected by energy price rises, to the generalised problem facing all consumers and citizens 
in closed, unresponsive political-economic systems. On the subject of repertoires, it should 
be noted that the so-called ‘Saffron Revolution’ was framed in very particular ways by a 
curious international media, which reproduced images of lines of protesting monks, a 
newsworthy story about a closed and secretive place. Informed views from within Myanmar 
suggest that monks’ embeddedness within the wider society and the more complicated 
nature of their participation in the protests had to be taken into account to understand the 
rebellion. Popular pastors or church leaders were also at the forefront of popular grievances 
about fuel shortages in Zimbabwe, with Evan Mawarire leading the #ThisFlag protests about 
economic and political rights, which preceded Mugabe’s removal in late 2017 in a coup 
d'état. A moral economic agenda was also present in how grievances about fuel prices were 
rooted in the urgent need for energy/ fuel/ transport to be able to work and provide for 
families, a theme which resonated across contexts. 
 
In each of Myanmar, Egypt, Mozambique and Nigeria, the Nexis search uncovered clear 
indications that the protests were amplified and scaled-up from local or national economic 
conditions, into a bigger political challenge. In Mozambique and Nigeria, this involved 
significant disruption to the economy and to everyday urban life. In Pakistan, energy protests 
had visibly shaped the electoral contest that followed, and the implications for policy 
thereafter. In Zimbabwe, too, grievances about energy connected with wider urban protests 
about the everyday issues of prolonged economic crisis, gathering pace as part of the larger 
political struggles in the period since the end of the Government of National Unity in 2013. 
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4.9 Enduring effects and political legacies 
These were frequently very violent events. In several cases protestors were clearly trying to 
re-establish the status quo ante, by pressuring local transport owners to keep prices low, for 
instance, in Mozambique and Nigeria. In each case, efforts to enforce a moral economy of 
energy prices, to disrupt everyday life, or to transgress political rules about public assembly, 
appear to have become violent only in response to state repression. In the decade in 
question, from crowds numbering in the hundreds to vast struggles involving hundreds of 
thousands of people took action in the knowledge of a reasonable risk that the state would 
respond with threats, troops using live ammunition, or even tanks. From an ethical 
standpoint, it is essential to keep the violence such protests can elicit at the forefront of our 
minds. These are highly dangerous forms of political expression: the critical question must 
by why public deliberation over energy and other costs of living must take place through the 
heated exchange of public protest? 
 
Some of the outcomes that appeared to feature across the cases were that protests about 
material needs create space for expression of wider political discontent. This is a different 
point to that advanced by Andresen’s (2008) public choice analysis, in which the political 
significance of energy protests (that they endanger the fragile legitimacy of authoritarian 
regimes, and have a history of being part of regime change) is limited to how these feature in 
the ‘political logics’ of ruling elites. A credible hypothesis may be that the particularly moral 
qualities of protests about basic subsistence secure them some protection against instant or 
total repression, in conditions where authoritarian rulers seek to protect or defend their 
legitimacy. In so doing, they create space for wider political complaint that cannot be voiced 
in the closed or restricted civic or political space. Protests that are sufficiently amplified by 
the media or other influential actors may demand an official response; how that response is 
formulated and who it seeks to benefit is likely to trigger further action, and counter-
response. The cases here illustrate the importance of an iterative reading of series of 
protests as connected episodes with feedback effects and escalating triggers. Some of these 
price protests have created opportunities for organisation and mobilisation, and an 
associated critique of corruption or authoritarian rule. Yet it is not clear that fuel-related 
protests directly spawned important or lasting social movements or activist groups in 
Myanmar, Mozambique, or Egypt, although a more direct link between fuel energy and 
political transitions was traced in each of Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Pakistan. 
 
4.10 The roles of external actors 
As noted above, the politics of energy are globalised and/or transnational in nature, so that 
key actors are only ‘external’ to events by a matter of degree.  
 
The international and national media play distinct roles in these unruly politics of provisions. 
The international media does not cover each and every energy-related protest, and it may 
not always categorise or label such events in the same or a consistent way; much depends 
on the newsworthiness of the protest (see the Zimbabwe case). 
 
The Media Review/Events Mapping methodology used a simple search and coding strategy; 
more sophisticated approaches are available, and could be applied to the Nexis database 
used here to greater effect. However, the rapid search and analysis enabled us to construct 
reasonably robust timelines with adequate basic information on the contexts, grievances, 
actors, repertoires, and responses. This data provides snapshots of moments as they 
unfolded (or as they were interpreted as unfolding), and therefore provide something of a 
corrective to the tendency to post hoc rationalisation in regard to major protest movements. 
However, it cannot gauge the relationships, prior ideologies and mobilisation histories, nor 
provide more than glimpses of any effects on empowerment and accountability. This 
highlights again the risks of depending on political events catalogues constructed chiefly 
from international media sources (as many are), and the need for attention to national media 
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discourses, activists and scholarly interpretations of these events to triangulate and 
challenge such perspectives.   
  
It seems likely that the international media can help to amplify protests internationally and 
nationally, creating external pressures on the state and supporting ‘scale-shift’, when the 
grievance changes from being a localised and specific to a generalised and broad complaint 
about economic and political governance. The contrasting examples of energy subsidy cuts 
eliciting variously furious mass protest and silent acquiescence in Nigeria and Egypt draws 
attention to the role of the media in framing public opinion about such cuts. 
 
Some key conclusions on the roles of external actors included the importance of the 
independence of domestic political actors for their credibility, and their vulnerability to elite 
charges that apparently spontaneous popular protests must have been engineered by 
external actors. This entailed sensitivity to how external support or approval of any kind may 
be viewed. The Mozambique case highlighted the gap between aid-funded civil society 
organisations and the popular protests around fuel and food, in which organisation civil 
society played no important role until the state responded with repression. 
 
Powerful influences on fuel pricing policy include the IMF, and the group agreed that the fuel 
price protests specifically in this set were all a species of what Walton and Seddon would 
term ‘IMF riots’ or protests against the austerity regimes of structural adjustment policies 
(Walton and Seddon 2008). More needs to be understood of different groups and interests in 
different kinds of energy and policy in each country, and of the incidence of cuts in the short 
and longer terms. Subsidy cuts often appear to be implemented without reference to the 
local political climate, or the resistance they may engender, a substantial threat to lives and 
livelihoods. 
 
Green energy reformers and other environmental actors also have a stake in these protests. 
Energy subsidies are generally highly polluting, and regressive. And struggles over energy 
are typically transnational (as the cases we saw here also showed). There is a nationalism of 
natural resources that warrants attention in these transnational struggles. In Mozambique, 
for instance, a huge damn to supply hydroelectricity to South Africa has raised questions 
such as ‘why we produce energy for other countries, but have none for ourselves’. It was 
also noted that Chinese companies were the main partners in each of the big energy 
projects noted in these countries. However, this is a story about global change, and not 
merely Chinese investment. The main investors in the Mozambican energy sector have 
traditionally been the South Africans (hydro and gas) and Brazilians (hydro and coal), with 
the Chinese moving only recently into the Pemba gasfields on the heels of the Americans 
and Italians who were already there. In Myanmar, Thai and Italian investments were also 
contentious. Although China is by far the biggest player overall, there is a wider ‘BRICS in 
Africa’ / ‘rising power subimperialism’ story, itself overlaid on a much older story of energy 
exploitation by former colonial / hegemonic powers (Shell in Nigeria, Burmah Oil in Myanmar 
being classic examples). 
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5  Conclusions and implications for research 
 and policy 
Energy protests on the scale and of the significance identified in each of these countries 
appear to be a comparatively new phenomenon across the developing world, reflecting the 
pace and nature of urbanisation, and changing demand for energy in daily lives and 
livelihoods, including as foundational for the price of food. They appear to slow, if not block, 
structural reforms, and they also appear to morph readily into more political protests with far 
greater potential than their origins in fuel prices or outages would predict. The politics of 
provisions provides a framework rationale. The sheer volume of fuel protests indicates that 
there are new grievances and new arenas for claims-making (once about food, now as much 
about fuel). These could have important implications for state–society relationships in 
FCVAS, depending on how stable or fragile those are with particular groups.  
 
Some of the preliminary conclusions from this analysis include that unlike food riots, fuel 
protests were indirectly related to global fuel prices, and tended to follow policy shifts rather 
than fuel prices themselves. The protests are thus not so much about malfunctioning of 
commodity markets, as a direct and unmediated claim on public policy, even though that is 
itself closely shaped by global energy markets. 
 
Nonetheless, energy protests were also rooted in moral economy arguments about the 
basics of everyday life, in modern economies where people travel for work. These moral 
economy ideas rest not upon claims to protection against hunger, but reflect instead a rapid 
change in the demand and supply of energy and its use in everyday life: rapid urbanisation, 
patterns of urbanisation, transport provision, and household energy supply and demand are 
key elements in this story, which the present inquiry touched on very little. Urbanisation, and 
in particular, the presence of large low-income, precarious populations in peri-urban areas, 
places a particular premium on the costs of mass transport.  Their moral basis was very 
likely strengthened by the involvement of credible, legitimate faith-based actors, including 
the monks in Myanmar and the church in Zimbabwe.  
 
Energy-related protests, both fuel price protests against subsidy cuts (as in Myanmar, Egypt, 
Nigeria and Mozambique) and protests about energy shortages and outages (more in 
Pakistan, Zimbabwe, later in Myanmar) are common, possibly increasingly so. These also 
increasingly connect with protests about foreign investment in energy. It seems likely that as 
societies urbanise further and become more dependent on energy and transport, the politics 
of provisions will centre further on the politics of energy – who can access or afford what 
kinds, and how that is regulated and enforced.  
 
In addition, while the moral economy nature of these protests about energy appeared to 
grant them some space for expression, grievances about energy often morphed very rapidly 
into political critiques of authoritarian rule and associated corruption, either in response to 
state repression of protests, through the support of more established political opposition 
actors for the struggle, or reflecting pre-existing grievances about the links between 
corruption, authoritarianism, and the economic conditions faced by the majority. These 
become fundamentally struggles over basic economic justice, and so challenge the 
distribution of political power in a direct way. Indeed, as scholars of fuel subsidies have 
noted, political complaints about energy are often associated with bigger threats to the 
popular legitimacy of a state, and have been linked to regime change in notable instances 
(Andresen 2008; Victor 2009; Strand 2013; Inchauste and Victor 2017).  
 
While the present study highlights some of the mechanisms through which energy protests 
may be linked to wider processes of empowerment and accountability, it is beyond its scope 
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to document these in any detail. The sense of political agency acquired during successful 
protests may linger even when further protests are blocked by intensified repression. In the 
absence of strong grass-roots organisations and/or strong links with dissident elite factions 
(reformists within the ruling party, opposition parties, elite civil society groups) this sense of 
agency is not easily channelled into a more lasting renegotiation of the political settlement. 
We propose that energy protests may clear pathways to greater (political) power for the 
(politically) powerless to hold the powerful to account and identify some instances of that. 
However, it is clear that more work is needed to establish how these mechanisms play out in 
such settings, and the risks of violence and disruption associated with such protests.  
 
Although energy protests can sometimes pack a powerful political punch, it is not clear to 
what extent marginalised and less powerful groups benefit from the gains achieved, either 
materially or in terms of enduring forms of political power. In some cases, other interest 
groups associated with such struggles, notably trades union activists, transport and related-
business owners, and domestic political oppositions were often the prime beneficiaries, 
sometimes at the expense of the interests of the urban low income and precarious workers 
on the protest frontline.  
 
The energy protest focus also provides a framework for looking at cross-class alliances, at 
how different categories of citizen come together over a common cause, with elite support 
and organisational backing. The question of who protests should also explore which groups 
depend on what energy, whether social media overcomes the rural/urban divide, and how 
different groups are incorporated into the political settlement (and therefore stand a chance 
of eliciting a benign official response). 
 
We also need to understand better the conditions under which protests succeed in achieving 
their aims, and what it means to succeed. A short-term reversal of a subsidy cut may be a 
success. But does it lead to any more lasting organisational change that empowers 
marginalised protestors, or enable them to hold public authorities to account in a less 
dangerous way? Alternatively, may it strengthen moral economy ideas within the political 
culture, so that accountability takes the form of iterative or repeated struggles rather than 
formal institutions or behaviours? 
 
5.1 Audiences 
Who would be interested in research on energy protests? Fuel subsidy reform proponents, 
such as the IMF and the World Bank, have a clear interest in political economy analysis of 
the prospects for reform. These are generally heavily elite-dominated political scientist 
frameworks, with limited attention to popular grievances and claims, particularly as these 
play out in authoritarian or FCVAS settings. Research on energy protests, situated within a 
more nested understanding of the political economy of energy, could help to explain the 
politics of provisions within which energy protests have meaning. The research should also 
be of value to the green and anti-fossil fuel movements, in helping to make sense of the 
popular struggles faced in rapidly urbanising settings. As Azagaia pointed out, these 
struggles should galvanise investment in renewable alternative energies.  
 
International aid donors and human rights champions would find this research useful to 
ground the material and the governance dimensions in an integrated analysis of 
empowerment and accountability processes as they actually occur. This would help identify 
new entry points and more effective strategies for amplifying social justice and human rights 
concerns, including developing better capacities to take ‘the pulse of the street’.  
 
Fuel price protests, and energy protests in the South in general, have been studied very little 
to date. The empirical and theoretical work needed to undertake such a study would 
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contribute a wider range of repertoires and more transnational contexts of struggle, in the 
specific settings of fragility and conflict. 
 
5.2 Key research questions/hypotheses 
Key questions to ask of the relationship between energy protests and the empowerment and 
accountability of marginalised groups in FCVAS settings include: 
 
• Are energy protests more important in FCVAS than in more stable political settings? 
How have these patterns changed over time? Which features of FCVAS settings make 
these modes of protest more common?  
• How does energy feature in the politics of provisions in different settings, with differing 
energy demand? Which groups suffer most from fuel poverty and/or dependence on 
fuel use? How does ‘natural resource nationalism’ feature in contention about energy 
policy? 
• In which spaces (e.g. transport hubs, social media, news media) and with which 
repertoires (peaceful and playful, disruptive or transgressive) have energy protests 
amplified into widespread popular grievances? What role do cultural forms and memes 
– music and images – play in this amplification? What do we learn from moments 
when predicted protests fail to materialise? 
• Are energy protests more likely to attract cross-class alliances over key grievances – 
and therefore to succeed in their aims (cf. protests about food prices, which mainly 
affect the poor)? To what extent are the interests of marginalised and disempowered 
groups, as distinct from party or other political group interests advanced by such 
struggles? 
• Are there specifically generational dimensions to waves of protest: young people may 
have very specific relationships to energy and the associated right to travel, and may 
have higher expectations of their state than their parents. How do such generational 
differences shape the dynamics of energy protests?  
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